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Abstract Drawing on Clausewitz’s classical theory, we argue that the emer-
gence of mass nationalism following the French Revolution profoundly altered the
nature of the units constituting the interstate system, thereby transforming the con-
duct of interstate warfare+ To validate these assertions—and thus to test
Clausewitz—we rely on quantitative evidence at the macro level, with a particular
focus on the global distribution of interstate war sizes, measured in terms of battle
deaths, over the past five centuries+ Drawing on extreme value theory, we demon-
strate that temporal discontinuities in the shapes of the tails of such distributions can
be used to draw inferences about the nature of the mechanisms underlying the blood-
iest events in world history+ This approach allows us to show that the interstate sys-
tem experienced a fundamental shift in the mechanisms underlying the production of
war sizes: a shift that can be dated to the years 1770–1810, and that resulted in a
systematic increase in war severity+ These same tools also allow us to rule out a
number of alternative explanations for this shift ~including changes in population
sizes and changes in weapons technology!, while providing evidence for a specific
account of war severity rooted in the mobilizational capacities of states+
“It is too early to say+”
—Zhou Enlai’s alleged response to Henry Kissinger’s question about the con-
sequences of the French Revolution+
Most current explanations of interstate warfare adopt what could be labeled a
“micro-level” perspective+ This perspective is characterized by a tendency to study
warfare on a disaggregated, case-by-case basis, and by attempts to predict individ-
ual outcomes by examining variation in the local contexts in which wars emerge
in ever greater levels of specificity and detail+ In this way, the broad sweep of
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historical forces operating at the “macro level” have generally been relegated to
the sidelines of empirical inquiry+ Fearon and Laitin succinctly summarize the con-
ventional wisdom:
In explaining World War I, we do not typically demand an account of why
France and Germany were separate countries in 1914+ + + + Nor is an explana-
tion for interstate war in general thought to require an account of why there
is a states’ system, though the question is certainly interesting and fundamen-
tal for international relations theory+1
In this article we stand this logic on its head+ While a micro-level explanatory
strategy represents a perfectly valid attempt to confront the overwhelming com-
plexity of geopolitics, and while we do not dispute the substantial advances that
have been generated within this research tradition, it is far from the only path
available for rigorous scientific inquiry+ Indeed, we argue that by adopting an exclu-
sively micro-level orientation to empirical analysis, the field of international rela-
tions risks sometimes missing the forest for the trees by obscuring the crucial role
played by macro-historical processes operating at the global level+
Proceeding instead from a “macro-level” perspective, we argue that the emer-
gence of mass nationalism following the French Revolution represented a pro-
found example of what Gilpin calls “systems change,” which fundamentally altered
the nature of the units constituting the interstate system, thereby transforming the
global production of interstate warfare+2 Following the observations of Clause-
witz, who witnessed firsthand the destruction wrought by the unprecedented arrival
of Napoleon’s levée en masse, we claim that the emergence of nationalism at the
turn of the eighteenth century ushered in a substantial increase in the capacity of
states to inculcate mass loyalties and mobilize mass armies, which in turn gener-
ated deep tensions between the principles of territorial sovereignty and popular
sovereignty that have driven patterns of interstate warfare ever since+ Based on
this reasoning, it is possible to trace the roots of the world wars of the twentieth
century all the way back to the epochal events of 1789+
To validate these assertions—and thus to test Clausewitz—we rely on quantita-
tive evidence at the macro level, with a particular focus on the global distribution
of interstate war sizes, measured in terms of battle deaths, over the past five cen-
turies+ In doing so, we make a number of methodological departures from the prac-
tices commonly used in quantitative studies of interstate warfare+ Rather than
performing disaggregated regression analysis on the central tendencies ~that is,
means! of our samples in an attempt to estimate the parameters influencing the
severity of individual events, we examine aggregate global distributions of the
frequencies of the most extreme events in our samples ~that is, the tails!+ In par-
ticular, we demonstrate that temporal discontinuities in the shapes of such tail dis-
1+ Fearon and Laitin 2000, 850+
2+ Gilpin 1981+
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tributions can be used to draw inferences about the nature of the mechanisms
underlying the bloodiest events in world history+
In making this demonstration, we draw on the statistical tools of extreme value
theory ~EVT! and the emerging science of complex systems, introducing for the
first time to political science a set of parametric and nonparametric techniques
well-suited to the analysis of extreme event sizes+ These tools allow us to show
that the interstate system experienced a fundamental shift in the mechanisms under-
lying the production of war sizes; a shift that can be dated with remarkable preci-
sion to the years 1770–1810, and that resulted in a systematic increase in war
severity+ These same tools also allow us to rule out a number of alternative expla-
nations for this shift ~including changes in population sizes and changes in weap-
ons technology!, while providing evidence for a specific account of war severity
rooted in the mobilizational capacities of states+ More broadly, our analysis points
to the intriguing possibility that commonalities exist in the mechanisms by which
war sizes are produced that transcend the particularities of time and place that
have occupied the attention of nearly all quantitative studies of interstate conflict
to date+
The article proceeds as follows+ First, we introduce the notion of systems change
and illustrate its basic dimensions by contrasting two paradigmatic examples of
such change: the emergence of the territorial state in early modern Europe ~terri-
torial systems change!, and the emergence of nationalism in the late eighteenth
century ~nationalist systems change!+ Then, we review in more depth the central
mechanisms underlying the emergence of nationalist statecraft and trace its con-
sequences for the severity of interstate wars+ Following this, we derive our central
empirical result, demonstrating that a temporal discontinuity in the distribution of
war sizes occurred at precisely the time of the French Revolution, resulting in
dramatically more severe conflicts after 1789+We then present our theoretical argu-
ment that this shift resulted from an increase in the capacities of states to mobilize
loyal combat forces, before conducting robustness checks on our central finding+
These tests allow us to reject alternative explanations rooted in population growth
or technological advancement, while also providing additional evidence linking
patterns of military mobilization to the emergence of extreme wars+ Finally, we
conclude by discussing the implications of our results for future research+
Systems Change in World Politics
According to Gilpin’s classic typology, the international system can undergo three
forms of change, organized in order of increasing comprehensiveness+3 Inter-
action change involves interstate processes, such as the movement of military
forces, the reconfiguration of alliances, or shifts in the cross-border flows of cap-
3+ Ibid+
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ital and currency+ It is at this level that we find the foreign actions upon which
most contemporary work in international relations focuses+ The next level features
systemic change, which pertains to the governance of the system and the arrange-
ment of its units+ It is at this level that Waltzian theories of system structure are
located, which focus on the changes in the distribution of military power, recon-
figurations of the territorial boundaries of states, and shifts in the international
hierarchy of prestige+4 Finally, systems change refers to transformations of the sys-
tem that are so fundamental as to alter the very nature of the system’s constitutive
units+ Here we find the truly epochal revolutions of international history that give
rise to entirely new types of geopolitical actors+
Viewed as a special case of this broader category, nationalist systems change
can be defined as the macro-historical transformation that brought about the emer-
gence of mass nationalism ~that is, the generation of national loyalties on a mass
scale! and led nations to play a central role on the world stage along with states,
roughly from around the time of the French Revolution+ Such transformations can
be understood as instances of “sociation” ~“Vergesellschaftung”!, the endogenous
process described by Simmel, through which action and agency constitute each
other interactively in a co-evolutionary fashion+5 They can also be seen as exam-
ples of what Wendt refers to as “constitutive effects,” as they represent changes in
the fundamental terms through which identities are defined and rendered relevant
for sociopolitical actors+6 However, whereas Wendt focuses on the constitution of
“type identities” that relate to the beliefs, values, and roles of states, here we are
primarily interested in the constitution of “corporate identities” that define the geo-
graphic and demographic membership criteria of states+
In the nationalist era, such criteria came to be increasingly defined on the basis
of narratives, symbols, and rituals that could be shared not just amongst a rarefied
elite, but amongst a broader cross-section of the citizenry that ~at least partially!
transcended the geographic, cultural, and economic cleavages that might other-
wise divide a country against itself+ It is through such advances that states gained
the capacity to forge collective loyalties on an unprecedented scale, and to endow
them with sufficient force as to induce a willingness to fight and die for an imag-
ined “nation+”7 Thus, when we speak of the emergence of “nationalism” in the
late eighteenth century, we do not simply mean the classical doctrine that nations
and states should be territorially congruent+8 Nations are not natural, pre-existing
features of the geopolitical landscape, but rather collectively imagined abstract
categories promoted by states and would-be states to facilitate the production of
corporate identities that can persuade citizens of the legitimacy of their joint sac-
4+ Waltz 1979+
5+ See Simmel 1950; and Cederman and Daase 2003+ See also Giddens 1979; Elias 1982; and Emir-
bayer 1997+ For the modeling of such processes, see Cederman 1997 and 2005+
6+ Wendt 1999+
7+ See Anderson 1991; and Deutsch 1953+
8+ See Connor 1972; and Gellner 1983+
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rifices+We thus treat the term “nationalism” as shorthand for a whole host of inter-
related processes and practices that gained prominence in European statecraft around
the time of the French Revolution, including appeals to popular sovereignty; com-
mon primary education for citizens; widespread generation of nationalist symbols,
images, stories, myths, and histories; and the mobilization of mass armies+ We
argue that adoption of this set of fundamental innovations in the technology of
statecraft transformed the very nature of the units comprising the interstate sys-
tem, profoundly altering both the constitution of state corporate identities and the
production of interstate warfare+
The Emergence of the Territorial State
Before discussing the innovations of nationalist statecraft in more depth, it will be
helpful to first consider an earlier, paradigmatic instance of systems change: the
emergence of the territorial state in early modern Europe+ This transformation,
which we refer to as territorial systems change, saw for the first time the construc-
tion of states claiming absolute internal dominion and sharp territorial boundaries+
The generation of this new constitutive form was rooted, first and foremost, in a
novel idiom of territorial sovereignty—a style of claim-making that hinged criti-
cally on the concepts of political legitimacy introduced by thinkers such as Nic-
colo Machiavelli, Jean Bodin, and Thomas Hobbes+ The modern idea of territorial
sovereignty revolutionized political legitimacy in a way that differed dramatically
from that found in premodern empire, the predominant large-scale organizational
form throughout the Middle Ages+9 Whereas imperial rule operates through dom-
ination radiating out from a political center and gradually tapering off in contested
frontier areas, the modern territorial state is a clearly demarcated organization that
controls its territory through the principle of “descending sovereignty,” which
grounds the locus of political loyalty in the sovereign ruler to whom the popula-
tion is subordinate and dependent+10
The territorial state also represented a revolution in the methods of resource
extraction+ The poor means of communication in medieval Europe forced the kings
and emperors in the Middle Ages to “outsource” the extraction of resources to
vassals and fiefdoms through feudal contracts that granted these proxies far-
reaching control and rights to extract tribute from their respective peasant popu-
lations against the promise to render military services+ The emergence of the
territorial state in early modern Europe thus entailed a profound shift from indi-
rect to direct rule that allowed rulers to gain direct coercive leverage over their
subjects without interference from competing political power centers+ This coer-
9+ See Strayer 1970; and Spruyt 1994+
10+ Empires were not the only alterative organizational form in premodern Europe+ Spruyt 1994 shows
how modern states emerged in competition with city-leagues and city-states; see also Ruggie 1998+
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cive capacity was most clearly expressed in improved procedures for tax collec-
tion and standardization of measures and currencies that led to considerable
economies of scale in the provision of coercive force+11
This profound internal restructuring went hand-in-hand with revolutionary
changes in the conduct of interstate warfare+ Following Hintze’s pioneering argu-
ments,12 it can even be claimed that this revolution in military affairs, which
brought about the shift from disorganized, ad hoc armed forces to modern stand-
ing armies and the concomitant increased scale of combat in the late Middle Ages,
initiated and further escalated the processes of state formation:
A consequence of the new wars was the diffusion of new technology and a
fundamental transformation of military structures+Armies became much larger,
adopted new techniques and weaponry, and expanded central organization+
Warfare became an extremely onerous and politically sensitive fiscal burden+13
In an environment of growing geopolitical competition, rulers had little choice
but to extract more resources from their subjects, thus paving the way for bureau-
cratic expansion and standardization+ In contrast to the chaotic nature and limited
size of warfare in medieval times, which was rooted in feudal levies and merce-
nary troops, the new era saw the state-led buildup and training of standing profes-
sional armies that introduced more regularity and discipline into warfare, while
also expanding its scale+14
In summary, then, territorial systems change can be seen to consist of three cen-
tral shifts in the nature of the units constituting the international system, as sum-
marized in Table 1+ First, it entailed a shift in the principles of political legitimacy,
from indirect rule to descending sovereignty+ Second, it entailed a shift in the meth-
ods of resource extraction, from feudal contracts to coercive taxation+ And third,
it entailed a shift in the modes of military organization, from irregular mercenary
forces to standing professional armies+
A Theory of Nationalist Systems Change
While representing a watershed in political organization and warfare, the emer-
gence of the territorial state in early modern Europe and the associated “Westpha-
lian moment” is not the only consequential instance of systems change in world
politics+ Here, we focus on nationalist systems change, which can be defined as
the macro-historical transformation that saw the emergence of mass nationalism
~that is, the generation of national loyalties on a mass scale! and led nations to
11+ Tilly 1990+
12+ Hintze 1975+
13+ Downing 1992, 65+
14+ Howard 1976+
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play a central role on the world stage along with states, roughly from around the
time of the French Revolution+ As with territorial systems change, the elements of
this transformation can be productively divided into three main dimensions: new
principles of political legitimacy, new methods of resource extraction, and new
modes of military organization ~see Table 1!+ We address each dimension in turn+
Principles of Political Legitimacy
As numerous historians have recognized, the tumultuous upheavals of 1789 rep-
resented first and foremost a repudiation of traditional sources of political legiti-
macy+ As opposed to the “descending” principle of territorial sovereignty that
justifies governance in personal, dynastic, or even divine terms, the French Revo-
lution introduced an “ascending” logic that defines the people, conceived of as the
nation, as the locus of political legitimacy+15 Following the famous declaration of
Abbé Siyès, it was now the nation as a whole, rather than the monarch, that assumed
the responsibilities of sovereignty+ As Hintze explains in his classical analysis of
the relationship between political and military organization:
The whole system rested on that altered concept of the state, whose germ
was the awakening of political consciousness in the population, the image of
the state becoming an affair not merely of the rulers but of the ruled and
being conceived of as a community, a corporative collective personality+16
In the words of Hall, the emergence of this “entirely new social entity” funda-
mentally reconfigured the structure of both internal and international politics:
In the nationalist era, statesmen were no longer speaking with the voice of a
prince, a dynastic house, or of a kingdom, or empire—the territorial patri-
15+ Calhoun 1997+
16+ Hintze 1975, 207+
TABLE 1. Dimensions of systems change
Territorial
systems change
Nationalist
systems change
Constitutive form Empire Territorial state Nation-state
Principle of legitimacy Indirect rule Descending sovereignty Ascending sovereignty
Method of extraction Contract Coercion Loyalty
Military organization Mercenary forces Professional armies Mass armies
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mony of the traditional European conception of sovereignty+ Nor did they
any longer articulate these interests or goals+ The statesmen of nation-states
began speaking in the voice of a sovereign people, a collective actor pos-
sessed of a collective identity and collective interests and goals, in the con-
text of both domestic and international social interaction+17
In a careful study of the development of state sovereignty, Osiander criticizes
conventional approaches to this topic for fixating on the Peace of Westphalia, when
“the most significant transition occurred with the French Revolution+”18 Agreeing
with this criticism, Bukovansky contends that:
International relations theorists today tend to overlook the French Revolution’s
importance to the evolution of the international state system, largely because
of the way in which structure is understood in neorealist international rela-
tions theory+19
Likewise, Sir Lewis Namier argues that “the political problems of the European
Continent in the nineteenth century were posed by the French Revolution; and the
basic change that it ushered in was the transition from dynastic to national sover-
eignty+”20 Indeed, F+ H+ Hinsley went so far as to say that the revolutionary recon-
figuration that started in the eighteenth century remains “the only significant change
that has so far occurred in history in the central ideas that men have brought to the
conduct of relations between states+”21
Methods of Resource Extraction
This shift in the definition of internal political legitimacy enabled a transforma-
tion of the means through which resources were extracted and distributed within
the polity+With the dominant idiom of political authority shifting from a descend-
ing to an ascending notion of sovereignty, the ruling elite could no longer rely
primarily on brute coercion to tax their subjects+ In fact, the French Revolution
itself can be seen as a failed “appeal by the state to the nation” to extract taxation
without representation+22 In his brilliant analysis of the infrastructural power of
the state, Mann explains that direct rule,
is not merely a matter of the state increasing rule over society+ Conversely,
“citizens” and “parties” also penetrate the modern state+ The state has become
a nation-state, also representing citizens’ internal sense of community as well
17+ Hall 1999, 20+
18+ Osiander 2001, 281+
19+ Bukovansky 1999, 197+
20+ Namier 1958, 165+ Also see Cobban 1969; and Schulze 1996+
21+ Hinsley 1973, 68+
22+ Ardant 1975, 214+
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as emphasizing the distinctness of their external interests in relation to the
citizens of other states+23
Whereas the prenational, territorial states “were little more than revenue collec-
tors and recruiting sergeants,”24 the emerging nation-states greatly expanded their
functional scope over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries+25 By
giving their citizens a direct stake in the political system, initially through legal
and political rights and ultimately through the benefits of the welfare state,26 nation-
alist statecraft allowed states to generate far higher levels of political loyalty than
the ancien régime+ Stressing the role of the French Revolution as a harbinger of
fiscal innovation, Ardant observes that “in the nineteenth century, in France as in
other countries, the bourgeoisie knew how much its profits were dependent on the
management of the state+”27 Of course, this process varied greatly in its effective-
ness, both within Europe and beyond, and firm senses of identification and loyalty
took a great deal of time and energy to construct, even in centralized states such
as France+28 Still, on the whole, the fiscal revolution associated with nationalist
systems change dramatically increased the ease with which rulers could extract
currency, capital, and labor from their subject populations+
Modes of Military Organization
The development of nationalist statecraft, and the corresponding shift in the defi-
nition of internal political legitimacy, was also associated with a shift in the defi-
nition of external political relations+29 As many contemporary social theorists have
recognized, practices that facilitated the production of homogenized national iden-
tities also created incentives for the leaders of states and would-be states to adopt
policies of discrimination and exclusion toward those populations that lie outside
the imagined bounds of the national community+30 Of course, the formation of
group boundaries and the salience of identity-based cleavages certainly predate
the emergence of nationalism in the late eighteenth century+ Indeed, there are good
reasons to believe that a tendency toward group biases is deeply rooted in the
structure of human cognition+31 Nevertheless, while the era of nationalism did not
invent all group loyalties and group boundaries, it did dramatically expand their
capacity to drive collective violence+ As many have noted, the politics of nation-
alism allows leaders to imbue contested territory with strongly emotional and sym-
23+ Mann 1993, 57+
24+ Ibid+, 504+
25+ Tilly 1994+
26+ Marshall 1973+
27+ Ardant 1975, 231 ~emphasis in original!+
28+ Weber 1976+
29+ Van Evera 1994+
30+ Wimmer 2002+
31+ See Tajfel and Turner 1979 and 1986+
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bolic meaning,32 thus increasing the ease with which political entrepreneurs can
mobilize mass conflict33 while undermining the search for peaceful bargaining solu-
tions+34 As a result, regions where the pull of national loyalties lack territorial con-
gruence with the reach of state intuitions have been found to be uniquely susceptible
to bloody internecine warfare+35
These observations highlight the importance of recognizing that, while the prin-
ciples of nationalism are “modular” and thus capable of quickly traveling great
distances amongst international elites irrespective of specific ethnic and cultural
conditions,36 sometimes even arriving “ahead of schedule” before the develop-
ment of full-scale industrialization,37 the adoption of this new technology of state-
craft was subject to a highly uneven process of diffusion both within Europe and
beyond+As a result, the achievement of the nation-state ideal has occurred at vastly
different rates, and with widely varying degrees of success, across the world+38
Moreover this uneven diffusion process generated profound tension between the
principles of territorial sovereignty on one hand and popular sovereignty on the
other that have underlain the dynamics of interstate conflict ever since+39
Having participated on the losing side against the Napoleonic onslaught, the
Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz was ideally situated to observe the cata-
strophic effects of this uneven adoption of statecraft technology+40 It was not with-
out a certain disdain that he characterized the narrow, technocratic, and ultimately
ineffective methods of the ancien régime’s approach to war fighting: “Not only in
its means + + + but also in its aims, war increasingly became limited to the fighting
force itself+”41 It would soon prove that the failure to grasp the logic of nationalist
systems change would be fatal to Napoleon’s opponents+ Analyzing this situation,
the great theorist of war renders vividly the consequences of this new mode of
military mobilization:
This was the state of affairs at the outbreak of the French Revolution+ Aus-
tria and Prussia tried to meet this with the diplomatic type of war that we
have described+ They soon discovered its inadequacy+ Looking at the situa-
tion in this conventional manner, people at first expected to have to deal
only with a seriously weakened French army; but in 1793 a force appeared
that beggared all imagination+ Suddenly war again became the business of
32+ Goddard 2006+
33+ See Beissinger 2002; Gagnon 2004; Petersen 2002; and Snyder 2000+ Similar mechanisms have
been posited in diversionary war theory ~Levy 1989!+
34+ Toft 2003+
35+ See Miller 2007; and Hechter 2001+
36+ See Anderson 1991; and Darwin 1991+
37+ O’Leary 1998+
38+ Wimmer and Min 2006+
39+ See Holsti 1991; and Barkin and Cronin 1994+
40+ Clausewitz 1992+
41+ Clausewitz 1984, 591+
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the people—a people of thirty millions, all of whom considered themselves
to be citizens+42
In response to this crushing defeat, over the course of the nineteenth century it
was the relatively authoritarian Prussians who took the lead in introducing educa-
tional reforms that had the dual goal of creating citizens ready to participate in
civilian life who were at the same time ready to defend the state on the battlefield+
As described by Hintze, the French lost their initial advantage after the fall of
Napoleon but had no choice but to catch up with the competitive pressure+43 After
the loss against the Prussians in the Franco-German war of 1870–71, the French
launched extensive educational reforms that led to an expansion of mass school-
ing with the explicit goal of reverting the military loss+44
Writing in the post-Napoleonic era, as France, Germany, and other European
powers struggled to achieve a competitive advantage in this novel landscape of
nationalist mobilization, Clausewitz was among the first to recognize that the pro-
found change in political order represented by the French Revolution had neces-
sarily transformed the conduct of warfare as well, by creating conditions “both in
France and in Europe as a whole + + + that set in motion new means and new forces,
and have thus made possible a degree of energy in war that otherwise would have
been inconceivable+”45 Moreover, while Clausewitz refrained from making firm
predictions concerning future trajectories, he clearly realized that it would be dif-
ficult to put the genie back into the bottle: “once barriers + + + are torn down, they
are not so easily set up again+”46 Thus, while it would be a mistake to claim that
Clausewitz predicted the globe-spanning conflicts of the twentieth century, he “was
nevertheless among the first to understand that popular participation in the life of
the nation propelled warfare toward its extreme and raised at least the theoretical
possibility of a conflict like World War I+”47 The implication, which we examine
empirically below, is that the fundamental causal mechanisms underlying the out-
break of the bloodiest conflicts in human history can be traced all the way back to
the epochal events of 1789+
Extreme Values and the Epochs of Interstate Warfare
To subject this claim to empirical scrutiny, we begin with a list of all major power
wars fought between 1495 and 1975 compiled by Levy+48 Using data from the
42+ Ibid+, 591–92+
43+ Hintze 1975+
44+ See Howard 1976; and Posen 1993+
45+ Clausewitz 1984, 610+
46+ Ibid+, 593+
47+ Lebow 2003, 215+
48+ Levy 1983+ While it would have been desirable to extend the time series to the period before
1495, we are not aware of any reliable data going beyond Levy’s seminal contribution+ Levy defines
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Correlates of War project,49 we extend this list to include all major power wars
fought through 1997+ We also augment the Levy data with corrected casualty fig-
ures from the Correlates of War project and Peace Research Institute Oslo ~PRIO!
battle deaths data set+50 For each war, we record the year in which it began, and
the total number of battle deaths produced among all belligerents, resulting in a
data set of 118 major power wars fought since 1495 ~see Table 2!+51
The theoretical and historical evidence reviewed above suggests that a major
transformation in the severity of interstate warfare occurred around the time of
the French Revolution, resulting in dramatically bloodier conflicts between states+
How can we use this data to judge empirically whether such a shift in the severity
of warfare actually occurred? The standard approach would assume a particular
distributional form ~frequently Gaussian!, summarize the data with an estimate of
its central tendency ~that is, mean!, and ask whether the value of this parameter
estimate is different for the subsample of wars that began prior to 1789+ However,
a burgeoning literature in the field of EVT has recognized that examining sample
means under the assumption of Gaussian-like tail behavior can be misleading when
an analyst seeks to describe the probability of observing the most extreme events
in the sample+52 Moreover, these problems are especially critical when analyzing
data characterized by “fat-tailed” probability density functions that produce unusu-
ally high frequencies of unusually large events+53
The key problem when faced with such data is that the normal distribution and
others like it feature probability density tails that decline too quickly relative to
the size of an event+While social scientists have generally been taught that assump-
tions of normality are safe because of the Central Limit Theorem, it is important
to remember that the theorem guarantees the normality of the means of random
variables drawn from a given distribution, not the normality of the tails+54 The
theorem, in fact, has nothing to say about the distributional form governing the
likelihood of the most extreme events observed in the sample+ As a result, tech-
niques that are good at quantifying the central tendency of a sample are frequently
bad at quantifying the behavior of the sample’s tails+55
“major power wars” as those wars in which at least one major power participated, while excluding
“extra-systemic” ~or colonial! wars+
49+ See Small and Singer 1982; and Sarkees and Schafer 2000+
50+ See Lacina and Gleditsch 2005; and Lacina, Gleditsch, and Russett 2006+
51+ In all cases, war events are coded at the highest level of aggregation possible, meaning that
separate episodes of military engagement are considered part of the same war, even if they occur between
different sets of belligerents, as long as they are part of a common causal sequence with no sustained
period ~that is, twelve months! of peace separating the hostile acts+ For instance, separate campaigns
by Denmark and Sweden are considered part of a single event labeled the “Thirty Years War” and
separate campaigns by Japan and Germany are considered part of a single event labeled “World War II,”
even though some historians would argue that these wars could be further subdivided+
52+ See Pickands 1975; and Smith 1987+
53+ See Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman 2009; and Mitzenmacher 2004+
54+ Sornette 2006+
55+ Alfarano and Lux n+d+
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TABLE 2. Major power wars, 1495–1997
Name Year Battle deaths Source
War of the League of Venice 1495 8,000 Levy
Polish-Turkish War 1497 3,000 Levy
Venetian-Turkish War 1499 4,000 Levy
First Milanese War 1499 2,000 Levy
Neapolitan War 1501 18,000 Levy
War of the Cambrian League 1508 10,000 Levy
War of the Holy League 1511 18,000 Levy
Austro-Turkish War 1512 24,000 Levy
Scottish War 1513 4,000 Levy
Second Milanese War 1515 3,000 Levy
First War of Charles V 1521 30,000 Levy
Ottoman War 1521 68,000 Levy
Scottish War 1522 3,000 Levy
Second War of Charles V 1526 18,000 Levy
Ottoman War 1532 28,000 Levy
Scottish War 1532 4,000 Levy
Third War of Charles V 1536 32,000 Levy
Ottoman War 1537 97,000 Levy
Scottish War 1542 13,000 Levy
Fourth War of Charles V 1542 47,000 Levy
Siege of Boulogne 1544 8,000 Levy
Arundel’s Rebellion 1549 6,000 Levy
Ottoman War 1551 44,000 Levy
Fifth War of Charles V 1552 51,000 Levy
Austro-Turkish War 1556 51,000 Levy
Franco-Spanish War 1556 24,000 Levy
Scottish War 1559 6,000 Levy
Spanish-Turkish War 1559 24,000 Levy
First Huguenot War 1562 6,000 Levy
Austro-Turkish War 1565 24,000 Levy
Spanish-Turkish War 1569 48,000 Levy
Austro-Turkish War 1576 48,000 Levy
Spanish-Portuguese War 1579 4,000 Levy
Polish-Turkish War 1583 17,000 Levy
War of the Armada 1585 48,000 Levy
Austro-Polish War 1587 4,000 Levy
War of the Three Henries 1589 16,000 Levy
Austro-Turkish War 1593 90,000 Levy
Franco-Savoian War 1600 2,000 Levy
Spanish-Turkish War 1610 15,000 Levy
Austro-Venetian War 1615 6,000 Levy
Spanish-Savoian War 1615 2,000 Levy
Spanish-Venetian War 1617 5,000 Levy
Spanish-Turkish War 1618 6,000 Levy
Polish-Turkish War 1618 15,000 Levy
Thirty Years’ War 1618 2,071,000 Levy
Spanish-Portuguese War 1642 80,000 Levy
Turkish-Venetian War 1645 72,000 Levy
Franco-Spanish War 1648 108,000 Levy
Scottish War 1650 1,000 Levy
~continued!
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TABLE 2. (Coninued)
Name Year Battle deaths Source
Anglo-Dutch Naval War 1652 26,000 Levy
Great Northern War 1654 22,000 Levy
English-Spanish War 1656 15,000 Levy
Dutch-Portuguese War 1657 4,000 Levy
Ottoman War 1657 109,000 Levy
Sweden-Bremen War 1665 2,000 Levy
Anglo-Dutch Naval War 1665 37,000 Levy
Devolutionary War 1667 4,000 Levy
Dutch War of Louis XIV 1672 342,000 Levy
Turkish-Polish War 1672 5,000 Levy
Russo-Turkish War 1677 12,000 Levy
Ottoman War 1682 384,000 Levy
Franco-Spanish War 1683 5,000 Levy
War of the League of Augsburg 1688 680,000 Levy
Second Northern War 1700 64,000 Levy
War of the Spanish Succession 1701 1,251,000 Levy
Ottoman War 1716 10,000 Levy
War of the Quadruple Alliance 1718 25,000 Levy
British-Spanish War 1726 15,000 Levy
War of the Polish Succession 1733 88,000 Levy
Ottoman War 1736 38,000 Levy
War of the Austrian Succession 1739 359,000 Levy
Russo-Swedish War 1741 10,000 Levy
Seven Years’ War 1755 992,000 Levy
Russo-Turkish War 1768 14,000 Levy
Confederation of Bar 1768 14,000 Levy
American Revolution 1778 34,000 Levy
Ottoman War 1787 192,000 Levy
Russo-Swedish War 1788 3,000 Levy
French Revolutionary0Napoleonic Wars 1792 2,532,000 Levy
Russo-Turkish War 1806 45,000 Levy
Russo-Swedish War 1808 6,000 Levy
War of 1812 1812 4,000 Levy
Neapolitan War 1815 2,000 Levy
Franco-Spanish War 1823 1,000 COW
Russo-Turkish War 1828 130,000 COW
Austro-Sardinian War 1848 7,500 COW
First Schleswig-Holstein War 1848 6,000 COW
Roman Republic War 1849 2,600 COW
Crimean War 1853 264,000 COW
Anglo-Persian War 1856 2,000 COW
War of Italian Unification 1859 24,500 COW
Franco-Mexican War 1862 20,000 COW
Second Schleswig-Holstein War 1864 4,500 COW
Seven Weeks’ War 1866 44,000 COW
Franco-Prussian War 1870 204,000 COW
Russo-Turkish War 1877 285,000 COW
Anglo-Egyptian War 1882 2,000 COW
Sino-French War 1884 12,000 COW
Franco-Thai War 1893 1,000 COW
~continued!
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For instance, if we fit a normal distributional form to our list of major power
wars, we would conclude that the probability density of war sizes is described by
a bell-shaped curve, with a mean of m  426,866 and a standard deviation of s
 2,574,392 battle deaths+ While there is nothing inherently incorrect about this
description of the data, the shape of the upper tail of this distribution would imply
that the probability of ever observing a conflict as large as World War II—which
generated more than 25 million battle deaths—is so astronomically small ~ p
, 1030! as to be essentially impossible+ Seen from the perspective of Gaussian
tail behavior, the fact that two cataclysms of the scale of the world wars occurred
in the very same century thus appears to be such an enormous anomaly that it
must be explained on the basis of highly unique, contextual factors that will likely
never be seen again in the history of humanity+
An alternative, and less sanguine, perspective is provided by the tools of EVT
and the emerging science of complex systems+ In a variety of scientific disci-
plines, ranging from geology to finance, scholars are increasingly coming to the
realization that large events in fat-tailed distributions are not “outliers” that defy
scientific generalization and therefore require event-specific, contextual explana-
tions+56 Rather, these extreme events are simply part of a pattern of tail behavior
that is not well approximated by Gaussian models+
56+ Sornette 2006+
TABLE 2. (Continued)
Name Year Battle deaths Source
Boxer Rebellion 1900 3,000 PRIO
Sino-Russian War 1900 4,000 PRIO
Russo-Japanese War 1904 111,000 PRIO
Italo-Turkish War 1911 9,500 PRIO
World War I 1914 8,753,000 PRIO
Franco-Turkish War 1919 1,000 PRIO
Sino-Soviet War 1929 2,000 PRIO
Manchurian War 1931 40,000 PRIO
Italo-Ethiopian War 1935 20,000 PRIO
World War II 1939 26,468,000 PRIO
Korean War 1950 1,255,000 PRIO
Russo-Hungarian War 1956 3,000 PRIO
Sinai War 1956 2,000 PRIO
Sino-Indian War 1962 2,000 PRIO
Vietnam War 1965 1,928,000 PRIO
Sino-Vietnamese War 1979 45,000 PRIO
Sino-Vietnamese War 1987 3,000 PRIO
Gulf War 1990 28,000 PRIO
Notes: COW  Correlates of War; Levy  Levy 1983; PRIO  Peace
Research Institute Oslo battle deaths data set+
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One of the most useful tools for visualizing such relationships is the log-log plot,
as shown in Figure 1+ Each marker on the figure represents a separate war, with
crosses representing wars that occurred prior to 1789 and diamonds representing
wars that occurred after 1789+57 For each of these two subsamples, we plot what
are known as complementary cumulative density functions ~CCDF!, which show
the probability of observing events larger than some threshold, x+ Because the val-
ues are plotted in log-log space, each step along both the x- and y-axes represents
an increase by an order of magnitude rather than an increase by a single unit+
Examining the figure, even at first glance one cannot fail to notice a striking
regularity: both CCDFs are very nearly linear in log-log space+ Indeed, the plot
makes clear that there exists a remarkably simple relationship between event size
and event likelihood in both subsamples, which takes the generic form:
CCDF~x!  Pr @X  x# ; xa ~1!
57+ Because we are interested in the behavior of the tails of our sample, we limit the plot to “large
events,” defined as those wars that caused at least 10,000 battle deaths+ This specific threshold choice
is justified through the use of TP-statistics below+
FIGURE 1. Interstate war casualties
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This is known as a “power-law” distribution, and it means that as the log of
event size increases, there is a corresponding linear decrease in the log of the like-
lihood that such a large event will be observed ~a form of decrease which is far
more gradual than the exponential decrease of Gaussian tails!+ Note that a in
equation ~1! is simply the slope of the CCDF when plotted in log-log space, as
depicted in Figure 1+ As a decreases, the most extreme event sizes become less
rare, and the upper tail of the distribution grows “fatter+” For instance, a  3
describes a CCDF in which every doubling of the size of x results in events that
are eight times as rare, while a 2 describes a CCDF in which every doubling of
the size of x results in events that are four times as rare+ In this way, the shape
parameter a provides an easy means of quantifying the “fatness” of a tail and thus
the likelihood of observing the most extreme events in our sample+
Such power-law behavior in tail distributions has been observed in a variety of
settings, ranging from the magnitudes of earthquakes to the fluctuations of stock
prices+58 Importantly for our purposes here, this particular distributional signature
has also been observed in a number of measures of the severity of human conflict
events, including the size distributions of interstate wars, international terrorist
attacks, and violence by domestic insurgents+59 However, while the observation of
heavy tails in the distribution of war sizes has been made before, the field of inter-
national relations has been slow to recognize the importance of this empirical pat-
tern+ Unbeknownst to most political scientists, over the past two decades the
emerging field of “complex systems” has, in a wide variety of empirical settings,
found repeatedly that power-law signatures in the distribution of event sizes are
characteristic of a particular class of systems, defined by the presence of highly
unstable dynamics dominated by the interaction of a large number of independent
units, and strong nonlinearities in the processes linking micro-level actions to macro-
level outcomes+60 For instance, in the context of earthquake magnitudes, Sammis
and Sornette argue that the unusually high frequencies of extreme events that char-
acterize power-law distributions frequently arise in such systems due to the oper-
ation of positive feedback loops, of the form:
dE
dt
 E m ~2!
in which the growth rate of some quantity E, is a positive function of E, and thus
increasing in time+61 When this acceleration is sufficiently fast ~that is, m . 1! the
result is a “critical state” in which small perturbations in underlying conditions
can have dramatically nonlinear impacts on macro-level outcomes, thereby gener-
58+ See Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman 2009; and Embrechts, Klüppelberg, and Mikosch 1997+
59+ See Richardson 1960; Cederman 2003; Clauset, Young, and Gleditsch 2007; Bohorquez et al+
2009; and Clauset and Wiegel 2010+
60+ Bak, Tang, and Wiesenfeld 1987+
61+ Sammis and Sornette 2002+
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ating the fat-tailed outcome distributions that are characteristic of power-law
relationships+62
The strongly linear patterns seen in the log-log plot of war sizes thus carry the
implication that the fundamental mechanisms underlying the generation of war
sizes are characterized by nonequilibrium processes of escalation though which
large wars become larger wars+ This implies further that events such as World
War II are not anomalous outliers in a stable system that normally generates smaller
wars+ Rather, they are a natural and inevitable product of a highly unstable system
of interacting units ~that is, states! whose military actions are subject to strong
forms of positive feedback+ Far from being singular events that require context-
specific explanations, the largest wars in recorded human history may thus instead
be driven by the same fundamental mechanisms that drive the production of all
interstate warfare+
However, mere visual inspection is not proof of a power-law relationship+ Indeed,
it is possible for a number of alternative distributional forms to appear approxi-
mately linear on a log-log plot, including log-normal and stretched-exponential
distributions+63 To confirm the power-law inference more rigorously, we adopt
the TP-statistic recently introduced by Pisarenko, Rodkin, and Sornette to ana-
lyze the distribution of earthquake sizes and the distribution of financial returns+64
The TP-statistic offers a nonparametric characterization of empirical deviations
from the power-law family of distribution functions given by equation ~1!+65 This
approach allows us to confirm that our empirical distribution of interstate war
sizes is well described by a power-law distributional form ~ p , 0+05!, and that
this relationship holds for all wars resulting in at least 10,000 battle deaths ~see
Appendix!+
Having confirmed the power-law distributional form, and found the specific
threshold above which this relationship holds, we can then proceed to estimating
a ~see Appendix!+ To investigate whether the degree of tail thickness—and hence
the likelihood of extreme war sizes—changed around the time of the French Rev-
olution, we divide our list of wars into two subsamples based on whether the wars
began prior to 1789 or after 1789+ We then calculate separate tail indices for the
two periods to judge whether there is a statistically significant change in the prob-
ability distribution of extreme war sizes+ As can be clearly seen in Figure 1, the
shape parameters estimated for these two historical periods are dramatically dif-
ferent+ For the period 1495–1789 we calculate that a1  0+65 6 0+1, whereas for
the period 1789–1997 we calculate that a2 0+356 0+07+ The substantial decrease
62+ This state is known as a “finite-time singularity,” meaning that infinite growth in E occurs in
finite time+ As the asymptote of this impossible infinity is approached ~also known as a “phase transi-
tion”! the system organizes itself into a critical state+ Carlson and Swindle 1995+
63+ See Sornette 2006, 96 ~fig+ 4+3!; and Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman 2009+
64+ See Pisarenko, Rodkin, and Sornette 2004; and Pisarenko and Sornette 2006+
65+ Calculated on the basis of the first two log-moments of the empirical sample, the statistic will
be close to zero for all power-law distributions regardless of the value of the shape parameter a, and
deviates from zero for all other distributional forms+
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in a for the latter period is strong evidence for a deep shift in the generating pro-
cess of interstate war sizes, which inclined the global interstate system to produce
wars of significantly greater severity after 1789+
Is it possible that this difference is due to mere chance, rather than representing
an actual shift in the underlying distribution of war severity? In fact, based on a
test of the ratio a10a2, we can reject the null hypothesis of equal distributions
with a high degree of statistical confidence ~ p 0+0045!+66 Alternatively, the equal-
ity of the distributions can be evaluated through a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which
has the advantage of not relying on the assumption of any particular distributional
form—power-law or otherwise—when judging whether two samples were drawn
from separate data generating regimes+ Using this approach, we again reject the
null hypothesis that the two samples were drawn from a common distribution with
a high degree of statistical confidence ~ p  0+022!+67
However, while the above tests allow us to conclude decisively that the distri-
bution of interstate war sizes was characterized by significantly more extreme val-
ues in the post-1789 period, some readers may wonder about the arbitrariness of
the particular year we chose to divide our subsamples and ask whether alternative
cut-points might have generated contradictory inferences ~for instance, might we
have concluded that the critical transition occurred around in the seventeenth cen-
tury in connection with territorial systems change, as described above!+ To address
this potential criticism, we demonstrate that our inferences are robust to any alter-
native cut-point that could have been selected+ To do so, we construct two inter-
vals around each year t, one that extends backward by T years ~t T ; t !, and one
that extends forward by T years ~t; t T !+We then form subsamples of interstate
wars that began in each interval and use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance metric
to judge whether the samples were likely to have been drawn from different dis-
tributions+ In Figure 2, we plot the value of this distance metric as a function of
year t for interval widths of T  75 years, while noting that robustness checks
indicate that our conclusions are not driven by this particular value of T+ By sys-
tematically varying the cut-points used to form our subsamples, this plot allows
us to directly visualize the plausibility of a regime shift in the distribution of war
sizes at any point in time+
Remarkably, the 95 percent confidence threshold for the rejection of null hypoth-
esis of equivalent distributions is crossed only once in the five-century period exam-
ined here, corresponding to a narrow range of plausible cut-points between the
years 1780 and 1790+ If we instead look to the 90 percent confidence threshold,
this range of plausible cut-points expands to 1770–1810+ At this level of confi-
dence, two additional peaks also become marginally significant, corresponding
66+ Here we make use of the fact that the ratio a10a2 of the estimated exponents, corresponding to
two independent samples of size n1 and n2 that are generated from the same power law, is distributed
according to the F-distribution with ~2n2, 2n1! degrees of freedom+
67+ The Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance Dnm is defined on the basis of the maximum distance between
two cumulative distribution functions, with higher values of Dnm reflecting greater confidence that the
distributions are unequal ~see Appendix!+
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roughly to a temporary decline in the severity of warfare following the Thirty Years’
War, and a temporary increase in the severity of warfare in the late seventeenth
century culminating in the War of the Spanish Succession+ However, neither of these
alternative cut-points comes close to the statistical strength of the break identified
at the end of the eighteenth century+ Thus, consistent with the expectations drawn
from the theory of nationalist systems change, we find that there was a sudden and
dramatic change in the global distribution of war severity resulting in systemati-
cally deadlier conflicts, that the size of this shift was significant both statistically
and substantively, and that its timing can be dated to the years immediately sur-
rounding the French Revolution+Moreover, the plot makes clear that while any num-
ber of changes have occurred in the severity of interstate warfare over the past five
centuries—indeed, scholars of military history have noted a number of “revolu-
tions in military affairs” over this period68—none have matched the impact of the
epochal transformation that occurred at the end of the eighteenth century+
68+ For overviews, see Krepinevich 1994; Levy,Walker, and Edwards 2001; Knox and Murray 2001;
and Gray 2004+ We note, however, that none of the major revolutions mentioned in these sources
seems to correspond to the late-eighteenth-century breakpoint identified in Figure 2+
FIGURE 2. Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance
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Escalatory Feedback in Mass Mobilization
These findings lead directly to the question of whether an underlying causal mech-
anism could be discovered that would simultaneously explain both the fat-tailed
nature of the distribution of war sizes, and why the shape of that distribution
changed so dramatically in the late eighteenth century+ We hypothesize that the
source of the systemic instability behind these findings lies in escalatory feedback
loops in state efforts to mobilize combat forces+
Recall from above that power-law distributions of event sizes have frequently
been associated with models of complex systems, characterized by positive feed-
back loops that accelerate the system into a “critical state” in which unusually
large events become unusually likely+ For instance, in the context of fat-tailed earth-
quake magnitudes, Sammis and Sornette argue that a positive feedback loop emerges
as two tectonic plates slip past each other: as the slip velocity between the plates
increases, the coefficient of friction between the plates decreases, which in turn
leads to a further acceleration of the slip velocity, culminating in a catastrophic
break+69
Here, we propose that a similar positive feedback mechanism arises in the con-
text of state efforts to mobilize combat forces+ Students of the security dilemma
have recognized for some time that there is a strong inclination to view any increase
in military mobilization by a neighboring power as potentially threatening+70 This
implies that the cost of persuading citizens to join the fight in a time of war will
be lower to the extent that military mobilization is already proceeding amongst
their enemies+ Thus, for each soldier mobilized in State A, it becomes that much
easier to mobilize the next soldier in State B, and hence easier to mobilize the
next soldier in State A, and so on+ In other words, the “friction” inhibiting mass
mobilization decreases as the “velocity” of mobilization increases in other countries+
On the basis of these simple suppositions, we derive a formal model of inter-
state mobilizational processes that accounts for positive feedback effects both within
a given country and between countries ~see Appendix!+ The model shows that,
under very general conditions, we should expect such feedback loops to produce
power-law signatures in the distribution of war sizes, as we observe in our data+
Moreover, the model demonstrates quantitatively that the observed shift in the dis-
tribution of war sizes is consistent with an increase in the strength of the escala-
tory feedback mechanisms linking state mobilizational efforts+
Indeed, such positive feedback mechanisms have always been fundamental to
the Clausewitzian understanding of interstate warfare+ Clausewitz reminds us that
war “is not the action of a living force upon a lifeless mass ~total nonresistance
would be no war at all! but always the collision of two living forces+”71 As a
result, warfare must be understood as a profoundly different endeavor from the
69+ Sammis and Sornette 2002+
70+ Jervis 1978+
71+ Clausewitz 1984, 77+
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“mechanical arts” in which “the will @is# directed at inanimate matter,” because
“in war, the will is directed at an object that reacts+”72 As Beyerchen argues:
For Clausewitz, the interactive nature of war produces a system driven by
psychological forces and characterized by positive feedback, leading “in
theory” to limitless extremes of mutual exertion and efforts to get the better
of one another+ The course of a given war becomes thereby not the mere
sequence of intentions and actions of each opponent, but the pattern or shape
generated by mutually hostile intentions and simultaneously consequential
actions+73
Beyerchen includes the qualifier “in theory” because Clausewitz argues that such
perfectly maximized exertions could only occur in the idealized abstractions of
wars “on paper+” In contrast, Clausewitz claims that “real wars” are characterized
by ubiquitous sources of “friction”: failures of statecraft that sap the efficiency of
a state’s administrative structures and the morale of its troops+74
We argue that with the advent of nationalist technologies of statecraft, states
experienced a substantial decrease in the cost of inculcating collective loyalties
amongst their citizens and persuading them to join in the defense of the home-
land, which in turn caused the “friction” inhibiting the acceleration of escalatory
feedback loops between states to be substantially reduced+As Clausewitz explains,
following the French Revolution:
The people became a participant in war; instead of government and armies as
heretofore, the full weight of the nation was thrown into the balance+ The
resources and efforts now available for use surpassed all conventional limits;
nothing now impeded the vigor with which war could be waged+75
By tapping into the demographic resources of the entire state rather than rely-
ing on mercenaries or professional troops organized in standing armies, Napoleon’s
levée en masse not only eroded the distinction between warriors and the citizenry
but also dramatically transformed the pace and the scale of interstate conflict:
This new system moved masses across half-continents with unprecedented
speed; replaced central stores by on-the-spot commandeering of supplies;
replaced linear tactics with column attack and dispersed fighting, trusting in
the spirit of the men, and holding to only one objective—to locate and anni-
hilate the enemy forces+76
The result of these innovations was a dramatic increase, both in the destructive
power of individual states, and also in the explosive potential of their conflictual
interactions+With the advent of nationalism, escalatory feedback loops in military
72+ Ibid+, 149+
73+ Beyerchen 1992, 67+
74+ Clausewitz 1984, 119+
75+ Ibid+, 591–92+
76+ Hintze 1975, 205+
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mobilization—which had always been a central element in interstate warfare—
were thus unleashed to an unprecedented degree, fundamentally transforming the
global production of war severity+
Robustness Checks and Alternative Explanations
Up to this point, our evidence for the theory of nationalist systems change has
consisted largely in the analysis of a temporal discontinuity in the shape of the
distribution of war sizes that occurred toward the end of the eighteenth century+
However, while we have argued that this discontinuity was the result of the diffu-
sion of nationalist statecraft, a number of alternative explanations for the shift could
be offered+ In particular, the nineteenth century witnessed the spread of the indus-
trial revolution and a concomitant rise in the ability to mass produce all sorts of
manufactured goods, including weapons, steam engines, and railroads+77 Such gen-
eral improvements in economic modernization and technological advancement could
certainly plausibly be connected to an increase in war severity, and could there-
fore potentially undermine our results+78
To address this possibility, we normalize our casualty figures to global levels of
economic development, dividing each battle death total by the level of world gross
domestic product ~GDP! per capita for the year in which the war began+79 If the
temporal discontinuity examined above were really driven by advancements in
material technology rather than altered principles of collective identity, this pro-
cedure should destroy our ability to observe a corresponding shift in the distribu-
tional structure of the normalized data+ In fact, we instead find that our results are
completely unchanged+ Even when casualty figures are adjusted for aggregate lev-
els of economic development, we still find the same power-law relationship between
the size of an event and its likelihood, and we still find the same shift in war
severity around the time of the French Revolution+ Moreover, we note that histor-
ians generally see industrialization’s impact on warfare as beginning in the late
nineteenth century ~especially following the U+S+ Civil War!, a date well outside
the confidence bounds of our estimate of the timing of nationalist systems change
~see Figure 2!+80
Along similar lines, the historical periods we examine here were also character-
ized by rising population levels+ As this means that larger numbers of people were
available to kill or be killed in interstate warfare, this factor could also plausibly
77+ Nationalism and industrialization should be seen as distinct processes+While Gellner 1983 argues
that industrialization precedes nationalism, more recent scholarship questions this link, as argued above
~O’Leary 1998!+
78+ Still the causal nexus is not automatic+ Analyzing the nineteenth century, Dupuy 1984 points
out that improvements in the mobility of troops increased their dispersion, thus counterbalancing the
damaging effect of enhanced weapons technology+
79+ Data taken from Maddison 2003+We also tried normalizing the casualty figures by the GDP per
capita of Europe, with substantively identical results+
80+ Chickering 1999, 14+
Nationalism, Mass Mobilization, and the Severity of War 627
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818311000245
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 18:39:46, subject to the Cambridge Core
render our results spurious+ We therefore normalize our casualty figures to global
population levels, dividing each battle death total by the total world population
for the year in which the war began+81 Again, we find that our results are com-
pletely unchanged, indicating that neither aggregate levels of economic develop-
ment nor aggregate population sizes are sufficient to account for the historical
discontinuity we document above+
Of course, there are any number of additional factors that could be raised as
potential explanatory variables to account for this shift+ Unfortunately, most of
these factors simply cannot be measured all the way back to the sixteenth century+
As an alternative strategy, we therefore seek to examine variation in tail behavior
not across time, but across space+ If there are some important determinants of war
severity that have been missed, examining variation in tail behavior across geo-
graphic regions may give us some insights into which factors are likely to be crit-
ical+ Because our list of major power wars is concentrated mostly in Europe and
therefore does not provide sufficient geographic variation for such analysis, we
instead rely on a list of all interstate wars ~not just major power wars! since 1816,
drawn from the Correlates of War project+While this data lacks the temporal scope
to directly investigate the discontinuity of 1789, it represents a dramatic improve-
ment in our capacity to make estimates on the basis of regional variation+
Using the same procedures described in the section above, we confirm that this
war severity data is well described by a power-law distributional form, and then
proceed to an examination of variation in tail behavior+ For each war on our list,
we code the location of the fighting on the basis of five world regions: Europe,
Asia, Middle East, Africa, and the Americas+82 Figure 3 shows the CCDFs for the
subsamples of interstate wars fought in Europe,Asia, and the Middle East+83 Visual
inspection of the plot reveals a surprising result: all three subsamples appear to be
characterized by the same shape parameter+ In fact, both tail indices and
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests converge on the same conclusion: we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that these regional subsamples are drawn from the same underly-
ing power-law distribution+ This is a striking result, given the enormous differ-
ences in cultural traditions, political institutions, and economic activity that exist
between these regions+ Indeed, this absence of variation in tail behavior between
world regions demonstrates just how fundamental the transformation of national-
ist systems change had to be in order to generate the profound shift in distribu-
tional form described above: more fundamental than any of the cultural, political,
or economic differences that have separated the practices of warfare in these regions
since 1816+ This result also dramatically reduces the concern that there is some
unknown omitted variable driving our central results, as this factor would have to
81+ Data taken from Maddison 2003+ We also tried normalizing the casualty figures by the popula-
tion of Europe, with substantively identical results+
82+ For this analysis, battle deaths from the world wars are disaggregated into separate regional
theaters+
83+ Interstate wars are sufficiently rare in Africa and Latin America during this period to preclude
estimation of a tail index, so they are excluded from consideration+
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be both sufficiently fundamental to influence the basic generating process of the
power-law tails, but also a factor so prevalent that its force could be felt in each of
these regions equally+We thus conclude that nationalist systems change is the most
likely explanation for the results described above+
Our final set of evidence relates more directly to the causal mechanism described
above+ Recall that we hypothesized that the power-law distribution of war sizes
results from escalatory feedback mechanisms in state efforts to mobilize military
forces+ If we are correct that military mobilization represents the basic substrate
of the interstate system’s dynamic instability, then data on military mobilization
should show distributional signatures of critical state behavior, and such signa-
tures should be most apparent when large numbers of states are forced to mobilize
against each other simultaneously, as occurred during the two world wars+
To examine this possibility, we use data from the Correlates of War project,
which measures the number of military personnel maintained by each state in the
system, for every year since 1816+ Ideally, we would like to show how the sequence
of military mobilization events in one state influenced the sequence of military
mobilization events amongst its neighbors+ Unfortunately, the lack of subyearly
data make such a direct test of the mechanism difficult, as it is impossible to ascer-
tain the precise order in which different levels of military mobilization were
achieved amongst different states in the midst of a war+ However, several patterns
FIGURE 3. Interstate war casualties
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observed at the macro level are highly suggestive of critical state behavior in the
dynamics of military mobilization+
The top panel of Figure 4 shows the size of the global population of military
personnel ~per capita! over time, while the bottom panel shows the distribution of
military personnel ~per capita! by state for selected years+ In the top panel, one
can clearly see that global rates of military mobilization are highly unstable, and
are characterized by rapidly accelerating growth during both world wars, as would
be expected in a system drawn to the emergence of finite-time singularities+ In the
bottom panel, we show that at the peak of both of these accelerated growth pro-
cesses ~1917 and 1945! the global distribution of military mobilization transi-
tioned away from a nonpower-law regime and into a power-law regime+While the
nonpower-law ~that is, subcritical! regime appears to be common to all years of
peace ~1910 and 1938 are shown as examples!, the power-law ~that is, critical!
regime emerges only at the peaks of the mobilization process+ It therefore seems
that global rates of military mobilization are characterized by a pattern of punctu-
ated criticality, a form of systemic instability in which rapid acceleration into crit-
ical state behavior at the global level is made possible through nonequilibrium
processes linking the war fighting efforts of individual states+ This pattern thus
provides further evidence that the dynamics of interstate warfare are driven by
strong escalatory feedback loops in the mobilization of mass combat forces+
Conclusion
By adopting a macro-level perspective on interstate warfare, while utilizing quan-
titative tools drawn from EVT and the science of complex systems, we show that
there is more than one path available for rigorous empirical inquiry in the social
sciences+ Of course, the approach adopted here is no panacea+ It is surely the case
that in focusing our attention on aggregate distributional forms we have elided a
number of contextual factors that have played a prominent role in regression-style
analyses of interstate conflict+ Thus, while we accuse the field of missing the for-
est, we may just as easily be accused of missing the trees+
However, the macro-level perspective advanced here also has its advantages+
Viewed from this range, many things become clear that would otherwise have
remained obscure+ Indeed, while context is always important, there are some con-
texts that can only be observed at macro scales+ One such context was the emer-
gence of nationalist systems change in the late eighteenth century, which profoundly
altered the production of corporate identities and the conduct of warfare in the
interstate system+ Building directly on Clausewitz, we have argued that this revo-
lutionary innovation in the technology of statecraft entailed a transformation of
the principles of political legitimacy, the methods of resource extraction, and the
modes of military organization, through which contemporary states came to be
constituted+
On the basis of this perspective, we have demonstrated that the interstate sys-
tem experienced a fundamental shift in the mechanisms underlying the production
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FIGURE 4. Global levels of military mobilization
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of war sizes—a shift that can be dated to the years 1780–90, and that resulted in a
systematic increase in war severity+We have also ruled out a number of alternative
explanations for this shift ~including changes in population sizes and changes in
technology!, while providing evidence for a specific account of war severity rooted
in the mobilizational capacities of states+ More broadly, our analysis points to the
intriguing possibility that commonalities exist in the mechanisms by which war sizes
are produced that transcend the particularities of time and place that have occu-
pied the attention of nearly all quantitative studies of interstate conflict to date+
Appendix
TP-Statistic
The TP-statistic is a specific statistic having zero mean and a prescribed standard deviation
under the hypothesis that a power law holds, regardless of the value of the shape parameter
a+ This statistic thus provides a non-parametric means of quantifying the statistical signif-
icance of deviations from power-law behavior+84 The TP-statistic is given by:
TP  ~10n! (
k1
n
log~xk 0x0 !2  ~0050n! (
k1
n
log2~xk 0x0 ! , ~3!
where xk is the value of the kth observation, x0 is the minimum threshold, and n is the
number of observations greater than or equal to x0+
By plotting the value of the TP-statistic as a function of x0 ~see Figure A1! we can easily
visualize the range of data values over which power-law behavior holds+ The black line
shows the TP-statistic, while the two grey lines show 95 percent confidence intervals+
TP-statistics, which remain within these bands, represent strong evidence of power-law dis-
tributions+ The plot shows that power-law behavior is robustly inferred for the distribution
of major power war sizes for all observations with greater than 10,000 battle deaths, and
that any deviations from this pattern are statistically insignificant+
Tail Index
The Tail Index, also known as the Hill estimator,85 is given by:
a *  ~10n! (
k1
n
log~xk 0x0 !1, ~4!
where x0 is the minimum threshold of the power-law tail and n is the number of observa-
tions greater than or equal to x0+ Note that for the purposes of parameter estimation, the
value of x0 is derived from the TP-statistic procedure described above, meaning that we
estimate the tail index for all observations with greater than 10,000 battle deaths+
84+ See Pisarenko, Rodkin, and Sornette 2004; and Pisarenko and Sornette 2006+
85+ Hill 1975+
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov Distance
If Fn~x! is a cumulative distribution function with n observations and Gm~x! is a cumula-
tive distribution function with m observations, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance Dnm
between the two empirical samples is given by:
Dmn   mnm n max6Fn~x!Gm~x!6,`  x  `+ ~5!
Model
To formalize our proposed positive feedback mechanism, let us postulate that the evolution
in time of the numbers S1~t ! and S2~t ! of mobilized soldiers in States 1 and 2 obey the
following equations:
dS1
dt
 g S1N1
b S2N2
c
~6!
dS2
dt
 h S2N2
b S1N1
c
, ~7!
where N1 and N2 are the total populations of the two countries, and g and h are constants
intended to capture any differences between the two countries that can be treated as fixed
on the timescale of the mobilization process+ The exponent b expresses the entrainment
FIGURE A1. TP-statistic: Major power war severity, 1495–1997
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effect of existing mobilization within a given country on future mobilization within that
country+ Similarly, the exponent c represents the feedback effect of existing mobilization in
the opposing country on future mobilization within the home country+
The solution of ~6! and ~7! is obtained by noticing that:
1g S1N1
cb dS1
dt
 1h S2N2
cb dS2
dt
+ ~8!
Therefore, by integration, we obtain S1~t ! kS2 ~t !, where k is a constant+ Substituting into
equation ~7!, this leads to:
dS1
dt
 KS1bc, ~9!
where K is a constant expressed in terms of N1, N2, b, c, g, and h+ We have thus now
arrived at an expression of the form of equation ~2! in the text, derived from quite general
suppositions about the feedback effects that are likely to be present in actual mobilizational
processes ~note that the equation for S2 has the same structure!+
If we assume that the two feedback effects ~within-country and between-country! are
sufficiently strong, such that b  c . 1, then the solution of ~9! reads
S1~t ! 
S1~0!tcb
~tc t !
b
, ~10!
where b  10~b  c  1!, S1~0! is the value of S1 at time t  0, and tc is a critical time
determined by the initial conditions:
tc 
b
S1~0!10b
+ ~11!
The solution equation ~10! exhibits a finite-time singularity as t approaches tc from below+
Due to the coupling of the positive feedback effects, the solution for S2~t ! is of the same
form, with the same critical time tc+ We note further that the condition, b c . 1, is quite
weak, as it is compatible with even marginal decreasing growth rate for each term taken
independently+
In order to understand how equation ~10! is related to the power-law distribution of bat-
tle deaths, let us assume that the conflict can be triggered at any time during the mobiliza-
tion process and that the number of casualties is simply proportional to the number of
mobilized soldiers+ Then, the distribution of casualties is the same as the probability den-
sity distribution, PDF~S!, of total soldiers S~t! ~S1 S2! at the time when the conflict is
triggered+ Because both S1~t ! and S2~t ! follow the same functional time dependence ~10!,
the sum S~t ! is also of this form+ The PDF can then be obtained from the following equation:
PDF~S! dS  PDF~t ! dt, ~12!
where PDF~t ! is the probability density function of the times at which conflict is triggered+
Assuming a uniform time distribution, PDF~t ! is a constant+ Hence, using equation ~12!,
we obtain:
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PDF~S! @
dt
dS
@
1
S 1a
, ~13!
where
a 
1
b
 b c1+ ~14!
Equation ~14! thus provides a direct link between the mobilizational positive feedback
effects we postulated above and the observed distribution of war severities+ Our finding
that a changed from 0+65 before 1789 to 0+35 thereafter implies that ~b  c! shrank much
closer to 1 around the time of the French Revolution, which in turn implies a dramatic
strengthening of the positive feedback effects linking mobilizational processes between states+
We note further that these conclusions are robust to changes in many of the details of the
model+ For instance, suppose that conflict is not triggered uniformly in time, but becomes
increasingly probable as the level of mobilization increases, that is, when time t approaches
the critical time tc+ Rather than assuming PDF~t ! to be a constant, we could instead assume:
PDF~t ! 
p0
~tc t !
g
, with 0  g  1, ~15!
where g captures the degree to which mobilizational processes influence the timing of con-
flict+ Then, expression ~12! leads to the same form of ~13! with only a change in the for-
mula for a from ~14! to:
a 
1 g
b
 ~1 g!~b c1!+ ~16!
References
Alfarano, Simone, and Thomas Lux+ n+d+ Extreme Value Theory as a Theoretical Background for Power
Law Behavior+ Unpublished manuscript, University of Kiel, Kiel, Germany+
Anderson, Benedict+ 1991+ Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of National-
ism+ 2d ed+ London: Verso+
Ardant, Gabriel+ 1975+ Financial Policy and Economic Infrastructure of Modern States and Nations+ In
The Formation of National States in Western Europe, edited by Charles Tilly and Gabriel Ardant,
164–242+ Princeton, N+J+: Princeton University Press+
Bak, Per, Chao Tang, and Kurt Wiesenfeld+ 1987+ Self-Organized Criticality: An Explanation of 10f
Noise+ Physical Review Letters 59 ~4!:381–84+
Barkin, J+ Samuel, and Bruce Cronin+ 1994+ The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules
of Sovereignty in International Relations+ International Organization 48 ~1!:107–30+
Beissinger, Mark R+ 2002+ Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State: A Tidal
Approach to the Study of Nationalism+ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press+
Beyerchen, Alan+ 1992+ Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War+ International Secu-
rity 17 ~3!:59–90+
Bohorquez, Juan Camilo, Sean Gourley, Alexander R+ Dixon, Michael Spagat, and Neil F+ Johnson+
2009+ Common Ecology Quantifies Human Insurgency+ Nature 462 ~7275!:911–14+
Bukovansky, Mlada+ 1999+ The Altered State and the State of Nature—the French Revolution and
International Politics+ Review of International Studies 25 ~2!:197–216+
Nationalism, Mass Mobilization, and the Severity of War 635
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818311000245
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 18:39:46, subject to the Cambridge Core
Calhoun, Craig+ 1997+ Nationalism+ Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press+
Carlson, Jean M+, and Glen H+ Swindle+ 1995+ Self-Organized Criticality: Sandpiles, Singularities, and
Scaling+ Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 92
~15!:6712–19+
Cederman, Lars-Erik+ 1997+ Emergent Actors in World Politics: How States and Nations Develop and
Dissolve+ Princeton, N+J+: Princeton University Press+
———+ 2003+ Modeling the Size of Wars: From Billiard Balls to Sandpiles+ American Political Sci-
ence Review 97 ~1!:135–50+
———+ 2005+ Computational Models of Social Forms: Advancing Generative Process Theory+ Amer-
ican Journal of Sociology 110 ~4!:864–93+
Cederman, Lars-Erik, and Christopher Daase+ 2003+ Endogenizing Corporate Identities: The Next Step
in Constructivist IR Theory+ European Journal of International Relations 9 ~1!:5–35+
Chickering, Roger+ 1999+ Total War: The Use and Abuse of a Concept+ In Anticipating Total War: The
German and American Experiences, 1871–1914, edited by Manfred F+ Boemeke, Roger Chickering,
and Stig Förster, 13–28+ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press+
Clauset,Aaron, Cosma Rohilla Shalizi, and M+ E+ J+ Newman+ 2009+ Power-Law Distributions in Empir-
ical Data+ SIAM Review 51 ~4!:661–703+
Clauset, Aaron, and Frederik W+ Wiegel+ 2010+ A Generalized Aggregation-Disintegration Model for
the Frequency of Severe Terrorist Attacks+ Journal of Conflict Resolution 54 ~1!:179–97+
Clauset, Aaron, Maxwell Young, and Kristian S+ Gleditsch+ 2007+ On the Frequency of Severe Terror-
ist Events+ Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 ~1!:58–87+
Clausewitz, Carl von+ 1984 @1832# + On War+ Rev+ ed+ Edited and translated by Michael Howard and
Peter Paret+ Princeton, N+J+: Princeton University Press+
———+ 1992+ Historical and Political Writings+ Edited and translated by Peter Paret and Daniel Moran+
Princeton, N+J+: Princeton University Press+
Cobban, Alfred+ 1969+ The Nation State and National Self-Determination+ Rev+ ed+ London: Collins+
Connor, Walker+ 1972+ Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying? World Politics 24 ~3!:319–55+
Darwin, John+ 1991+ The End of the British Empire: The Historical Debate+ Oxford, England:
Blackwell+
Deutsch, Karl W+ 1953+ Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of
Nationality+ Cambridge, Mass+: MIT Press+
Downing, Brian M+ 1992+ The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and
Autocracy in Early Modern Europe+ Princeton, N+J+: Princeton University Press+
Dupuy, Trevor N+ 1984+ The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare+ Fairfax, Va+: Hero Books+
Elias, Norbert+ 1982 @1939# + The Civilizing Process+ Vol+ 2, State Formation and Civilization+ Trans-
lated by Edmund Jephcott+ Oxford, England: Blackwell+
Embrechts, Paul, Claudia Klüppelberg, Thomas Mikosch+ 1997+ Modelling Extremal Events for Insur-
ance and Finance+ Berlin: Springer+
Emirbayer, Mustafa+ 1997+ Manifesto for a Relational Sociology+ American Journal of Sociology 103
~2!:281–317+
Fearon, James D+, and David D+ Laitin+ 2000+ Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity+
International Organization 54 ~4!:845–77+
Fearon, James D+, and Alexander Wendt+ 2002+ Rationalism v+ Constructivism: A Skeptical View+ In
Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A+ Sim-
mons, 52–72+ London: Sage+
Gagnon, Valère P+, Jr+ 2004+ The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s+ Ithaca, N+Y+:
Cornell University Press+
Gellner, Ernest+ 1983+ Nations and Nationalism+ Ithaca, N+Y+: Cornell University Press+
Giddens, Anthony+ 1979+ Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in
Social Analysis+ Berkeley: University of California Press+
Gilpin, Robert+ 1981+ War and Change in World Politics+ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press+
Goddard, Stacie E+ 2006+ Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy+
International Organization 60 ~1!:35– 68+
636 International Organization
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818311000245
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 18:39:46, subject to the Cambridge Core
Gray, Colin S+ 2004+ Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History+
New York: Routledge+
Hall, Rodney Bruce+ 1999+ National Collective Identity: Social Constructs and International Systems+
New York: Columbia University Press+
Hechter, Michael+ 2001+ Containing Nationalism+ Oxford, England: Oxford University Press+
Hill, Bruce M+ 1975+ A Simple General Approach to Inference About the Tail of a Distribution+ Annals
of Statistics 3 ~5!:1163–74+
Hinsley, Francis H+ 1973+ Nationalism and the International System+ London: Hodder and Stoughton+
Hintze, Otto+ 1975+ Military Organization and the Organization of the State+ In The Historical Essays
of Otto Hintze, edited by Felix Gilbert, 178–215+ New York: Oxford University Press+
Holsti, Kalevi J+ 1991+ Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648–1989+ Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press+
Howard, Michael+ 1976+ War in European History+ Oxford, England: Oxford University Press+
Jervis, Robert+ 1978+ Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma+ World Politics 30 ~2!:167–214+
Knox, McGregor, and Williamson Murray, eds+ 2001+ The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–
2050+ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press+
Krepinevich, Andrew F+ 1994+ Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions+ National
Interest 37:30– 42+
Lacina, Bethany, and Nils Petter Gleditsch+ 2005+ Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Data-
set of Battle Deaths+ European Journal of Population 21 ~2–3!:145– 66+
Lacina, Bethany, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Bruce Russett+ 2006+ The Declining Risk of Death in Bat-
tle+ International Studies Quarterly 50 ~3!:673–80+
Lebow, Richard Ned+ 2003+ The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders+ Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press+
Levy, Jack S+ 1983+ War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495–1975+ Lexington: University Press
of Kentucky+
———+ 1989+ The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique+ In Handbook of War Studies, edited by
Manus I+ Midlarsky, 259–88+ Boston: Unwin Hyman+
Levy, Jack S+, Thomas C+Walker, and Martin S+ Edwards+ 2001+ Continuity and Change in the Evolu-
tion of Warfare+ In War in a Changing World, edited by Zeev Maoz and Azar Gat, 15– 48+ Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press+
Maddison, Angus+ 2003+ The World Economy: Historical Statistics+ Paris: OECD+
Mann, Michael+ 1993+ The Sources of Social Power+ Vol+ 2, The Rise of Classes and Nation-States,
1760–1914+ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press+
Marshall, Thomas H+ 1973+ Class, Citizenship, and Social Development: Essays+ Westport, Conn+:
Greenwood Press+
Miller, Benjamin+ 2007+ States, Nations, and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and
Peace+ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press+
Mitzenmacher, Michael+ 2004+ A Brief History of Generative Models for Power Law and Lognormal
Distributions+ Internet Mathematics 1 ~2!:226–51+
Namier, Lewis Bernstein+ 1958+ Vanished Supremacies: Essays on European History, 1812–1918+ Lon-
don: H+ Hamilton+
O’Leary, Brendan+ 1998+ Ernest Gellner’s Diagnoses of Nationalism+ In The State of the Nation: Ernest
Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism, edited by John A+ Hall, 40–88+ Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press+
Osiander, Andreas+ 2001+ Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth+ Inter-
national Organization 55 ~2!:251–87+
Petersen, Roger D+ 2002+ Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-
Century Eastern Europe+ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press+
Pickands, James, III+ 1975+ Statistical Inference Using Extreme Order Statistics+ The Annals of Statis-
tics 3 ~1!:119–31+
Pisarenko, Vladilen F+, Michael V+ Rodkin, and Didier Sornette+ 2004+ Deviations of the Distributions
of Seismic Energies from the Gutenberg-Richter Law+ Computational Seismology 35:138–59+
Nationalism, Mass Mobilization, and the Severity of War 637
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818311000245
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 18:39:46, subject to the Cambridge Core
Pisarenko, Vladilen F+, and Didier Sornette+ 2006+ New Statistic for Financial Return Distributions:
Power-Law or Exponential? Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and Its Applications 366:387– 400+
Posen, Barry R+ 1993+ Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power+ International Security 18
~2!:80–124+
Richardson, Lewis F+ 1960+ Statistics of Deadly Quarrels, Edited by Quincy Wright and C+ C+ Lienau+
Chicago: Quadrangle Books+
Ruggie, John Gerard+ 1998+ Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Insitutionaliza-
tion+ London: Routledge+
Sammis, Charles G+, and Didier Sornette+ 2002+ Positive Feedback, Memory, and the Predictability of
Earthquakes+ Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 99 ~Suppl+ 1!:2501–8+
Sarkees, Meredith Reid, and Phil Schafer+ 2000+ The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to
1997+ Conflict Management and Peace Science 18 ~1!:123– 44+
Schulze, Hagen+ 1996+ States, Nations and Nationalism: From the Middle Ages to the Present+ Trans-
lated by William E+ Yuill+ Oxford, England: Blackwell+
Simmel, Georg+ 1950+ The Sociology of Georg Simmel+ Translated and edited by Kurt H+Wolff+ Glen-
coe, Ill+: Free Press+
Small, Melvin, and J+ David Singer+ 1982+ Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980+
2d ed+ Beverly Hills, Calif+: Sage+
Smith, Richard L+ 1987+ Estimating Tails of Probability Distributions+ The Annals of Statistics 15
~3!:1174–207+
Snyder, Jack+ 2000+ From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict+ New York:
Norton+
Sornette, Didier+ 2006+ Critical Phenomena in Natural Sciences. Chaos, Fractals, Self-Organization,
and Disorder: Concepts and Tools+ 2d ed+ Berlin: Springer+
Spruyt, Hendrik+ 1994+ The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change+ Prince-
ton, N+J+: Princeton University Press+
Strayer, Joseph R+ 1970+ On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State+ Princeton, N+J+: Princeton Uni-
versity Press+
Tajfel, Henri, and John+ C+ Turner+ 1979+ An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict+ In The Social
Psychology of Intergroup Relations, edited by William G+Austin and Stephan Worchel, 33– 47+Mon-
terey, Calif+: Brooks0Cole+
———+ 1986+ The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behaviour+ In Psychology of Intergroup Rela-
tions, edited by Stephan Worchel and William G+ Austin, 7–24+ 2d ed+ Chicago: Nelson-Hall+
Tilly, Charles+ 1990+ Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990+ Oxford, England: Blackwell+
———+ 1994+ States and Nationalism in Europe 1492–1992+ Theory and Society 23 ~1!:131– 46+
Toft, Monica Duffy+ 2003+ The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility
of Territory+ Princeton, N+J+: Princeton University Press+
Van Evera, Stephen+ 1994+ Hypotheses on Nationalism and War+ International Security 18 ~4!:5–39+
Waltz, Kenneth N+ 1979+ Theory of International Politics+ Reading, Mass+: Addison-Wesley+
Weber, Eugen+ 1976+ Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914+ Stan-
ford, Calif+: Stanford University Press+
Wendt, Alexander+ 1999+ Social Theory of International Politics+ Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press+
Wimmer, Andreas+ 2002+ Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of Modernity+ Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press+
Wimmer, Andreas, and Brian Min+ 2006+ From Empire to Nation-State: Explaining Wars in the Mod-
ern World, 1816–2001+ American Sociological Review 71 ~6!:867–97+
Woodwell, Douglas+ 2007+ Nationalism in International Relations: Norms, Foreign Policy, and Enmity+
New York: Palgrave Macmillan+
Yack, Bernard+ 2001+ Popular Sovereignty and Nationalism+ Political Theory 29 ~4!:517–36+
638 International Organization
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818311000245
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 18:39:46, subject to the Cambridge Core
